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6	UNITED STAT	ES DISTRICT COURT	
7	DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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9	PETER J. MUNOZ, JR.,		
10	Petitioner,	Case No. 3:11-CV-00197-LRH-(RAM)	
11	VS.	<u>ORDER</u>	
12	GREGORY SMITH, et al.,		
13	Respondents.		
14			
15	Petitioner has paid the filing fee. The	e court has reviewed his petition for a writ of habeas	
16	corpus pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District		
17	Courts. Petitioner needs to show cause why the court should not dismiss this action as untimely.		
18	Congress has limited the time in which a person can petition for a writ of habeas corpus		
19	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254:		
20	A 1-year period of limitation s	shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus	
21	by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—		
22	(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;		
23	in violation of the Constitution	ediment to filing an application created by State action nor laws of the United States is removed, if the	
24		stitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the	
25	made retroactively applicable	s been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and to cases on collateral review; or	
26	have been discovered through	ual predicate of the claim or claims presented could the exercise of due diligence.	
27	28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Any time spent pursuing a properly-filed application for state post-		
28	conviction review or other collateral review does not count toward this one-year limitation period.		

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The period of limitation resumes when the post-conviction judgment becomes final upon issuance of the remittitur. <u>Jefferson v. Budge</u>, 419 F.3d 1013, 1015 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). Section 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling. <u>Holland v. Florida</u>, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). "[A] 'petitioner' is 'entitled to equitable tolling' only if he shows '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." <u>Id.</u> at 2562 (quoting <u>Pace</u>, 544 U.S. at 418). The petitioner effectively files a federal petition when he mails it to the court. <u>Stillman v. Lamarque</u>, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The court can raise the issue of timeliness on its own motion. <u>Day v. McDonough</u>, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006); <u>Herbst v. Cook</u>, 260 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).

In the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, petitioner pleaded no contest to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14. The court entered the judgment of conviction on December 8, 2006.¹ Petitioner did not appeal, and the judgment of conviction became final on January 8, 2007, when the time to appeal expired. See Nev. R. App. P. 4(b). One hundred thirty-four (134) days later, on May 22, 2007, petitioner filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state district court. The district court denied the petition, petitioner appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court remanded for the district court to appoint counsel to represent petitioner. After that, the district court again denied the petition, petitioner appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial on March 11, 2010. Remittitur would have issued on or around April 5, 2011. See Nev. R. App. P. 41. Three hundred forty-five (345) days later, on March 16, 2011, this court received the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.²

On its face, the petition is untimely. One hundred thirty-four (134) days passed between the finality of the judgment of conviction and the filing of the state habeas corpus petition. The period of limitation was tolled while the state habeas corpus petition was pending in the state courts. 28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Petitioner alleges at p. 1 of the petition that he was convicted on December 4. He attached an order of the Nevada Supreme Court, Case No. 50306, dated May 9, 2008, which stated that petitioner was convicted on December 8. This court will use the later date in its calculations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Petitioner did not state in the space provided when he gave the petition to a prison officer for mailing to the court.

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1	U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Three hundred forty-five (345) days passed between the conclusion of the	
2	state habeas corpus proceedings and the commencement of the federal habeas corpus proceedings.	
3	A total of four hundred seventy-nine (479) non-tolled days have passed since the finality of the	
4	judgment of conviction, and that time exceeds the one-year period of limitation established in 28	
5	U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner will need to show cause why the court should not dismiss this	
6	action as untimely.	
7	IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the clerk of the court file the petition for a writ of	
8	habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.	
9	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner shall have thirty (30) days from the date of entry	
10	of this order to show cause why the court should not dismiss this action as untimely. Failure to	
11	comply with this order will result in the dismissal of this action.	
12	DATED this 31st day of May, 2011.	
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14	Outono	
15	LARRY R HICKS	
16	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
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